When policy makers propose new policies, there is a need to assess the costs and benefits of the proposed policy measures, to compare them to existing and alternative policies, and to rank them according to their effectiveness. In the case of equipment energy efficiency regulations, comparing the effects of a range of alternative policy measures requires evaluating their effects on consumers' budgets, on national energy consumption and economics, and on the environment. Such an approach should be able to represent in a single framework the particularities of each policy measure and provide comparable results. This report presents an integrated methodological framework to assess prospectively the energy, economic, and environmental impacts of energy efficiency policy measures. The framework builds on the premise that the comparative assessment of energy efficiency policy measures should (a) rely on a common set of primary data and parameters, (b) follow a single functional approach to estimate the energy, economic, and emissions savings resulting from each assessed measure, and (c) present results through a s et of comparable indicators. This framework elaborates on models that the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has used in support of its rulemakings on mandatory energy efficiency standards. In addition to a rigorous analysis of the impacts of mandatory standards, DOE compares the projected results of alternative policy measures to those projected to be achieved by the standards. The framework extends such an approach to provide a broad, generic methodology, with no geographic or sectoral limitations, that is useful for evaluating any type of equipment energy efficiency market intervention. The report concludes with a demonstration of how to use the framework to compare the impacts estimated for twelve policy measures focusing on increasing the energy efficiency of gas furnaces in the United States.
Introduction
When policy makers propose new policies, there is a need to assess the costs and benefits of the proposed policy measures, to compare them to existing and alternative policies (Bernstein et al, 2005) , and to rank them according to their effectiveness. In the case of equipment 1 energy efficiency regulations, policy measures may include such command-and-control initiatives as mandatory energy efficiency standards, as well as market-based mechanisms, such as rebates, tax credits, labeling programs, or government purchases. In the assessment of these policy measures, costs refer to the greater initial enduser price and potentially greater installation, maintenance and repair costs usually associated with more energy-efficient devices, while benefits correspond to all energy-related savings resulting from the use of more efficient equipment. Evaluating the effects of a range of alternative policy measures on consumers' budgets and on the environment requires a comprehensive methodological approach. Such an approach should be able to represent in a single framework the particularities of each policy measure and provide comparable results.
The existing literature on energy efficiency provides methodologies and assessment studies related to market interventions aiming at reducing energy consumption. The methodologies range from general orientation on how to design, implement, and evaluate energy efficiency programs (IEA, 2000; Sebold et al, 2001; Wiel and McMahon, 2005) to specific guidance on assessing the potential impacts of these programs (Kintner-Meyer et al, 2003; Mosenthal and Loiter, 2007; CLASP, 2011a) . The assessment studies present the potential for energy savings from a range of policy measures and/or programs. 2 Most of this body of literature, however, either (a) does not provide sufficient details on how to assess the impacts of the interventions or (b) focuses on assessing specific policy measures.
This report presents an integrated methodological framework to assess prospectively the energy, economic, and environmental impacts of energy efficiency policy measures. The framework builds on the premise that the comparative assessment of energy efficiency policy measures should (a) rely on a common set of primary data and parameters, (b) follow a single functional approach to estimate the energy, economic, and emissions savings resulting from each assessed measure, and (c) present results through a set of comparable indicators. This framework elaborates on models that the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has used in support of its rulemakings on mandatory energy efficiency standards. 3 In addition to a rigorous analysis of the impacts of mandatory standards, DOE compares the projected results of alternative policy measures to those projected to be achieved by the standards. The framework extends such an approach to provide a broad, generic methodology, with no geographic or sectoral limitations, that is useful for evaluating any type of energy efficiency market intervention.
The report is organized into the following five sections: Section 2 presents the framework with its general procedure and formulation to assess and compare the effects of energy efficiency policy measures; Section 3 describes a range of energy efficiency policy measures and delineates how their specific impacts can be fit to the framework's general calculation procedure; Section 4 describes how to compare individual results from each policy measure assessed; Section 5 provides a simple demonstration of how to apply the framework to assess measures impacting gas furnaces in the U.S.; and Section 6 concludes with the benefits of the framework. Appendices A and B detail methodological issues.
Framework Description
When a government agency plans a new energy efficiency policy, the goal is to reduce the overall impacts resulting from the use of energy-consuming devices. Several alternative policy measures can help to achieve such a goal. Each measure may provide different benefits and impose different costs and, therefore, needs to be compared to the others. Comparing a range of policy measures intended to comprise an energy efficiency policy requires -for the sake of comparability -that the analysis of all candidate measures use a common set of input data and express the benefits of the measures through the same results indicators.
The input data typically describe the existing and potential technology from the engineering, operational, economic, and market perspectives. These data, after being analyzed, lead to estimates of the expected results of a policy measure, specifically the changes in market share of devices with different levels of energy efficiency and the resulting energy consumption, consumers' investments and operating costs, and pollutant 4 emissions that are expected to occur within a given timeframe. Depending on the input data, such estimates can be generated for a business-as-usual (base case) scenario -a scenario with no changes in the existing policies -or a scenario in which a certain policy measure is implemented (policy measure case).
Five indicators can be used to express the benefits of an energy efficiency policy measure, as compared to the base case scenario. These indicators account for energy and resource usage, consumer and social economic values, and emissions to the environment resulting from a new vintage of equipment marketed under the influence of the policy measure. The indicators are: (a) Total 5 4 This may include greenhouse gas emissions and any other pollutant discharges to the environment.
Energy Savings (TES)
and Total Water Savings (TWS); (b) total Consumers Net Present Value (cNPV) and Social Net Present Value (sNPV); and (c) Total Emissions Reduction (TER). The total savings and total emissions reduction indicators quantify, in physical units, the estimated amount of avoided energy (TES) and water (TWS) use, as well as of avoided emissions (TER), achieved by implementing the policy measure. The cost effectiveness indicators reflect the estimated aggregate net monetary benefits enjoyed by consumers (cNPV) and the wider society 6 (sNPV) resulting from the policy measure.
Each of these five indicators can be used by itself to assess comparatively the impacts in one realm of a group of proposed efficiency measures. However, these estimates also can be used to assess required tradeoffs between the energy, economic, and environmental goals of a policy. One typical tradeoff is between efficiency improvements and their corresponding costs. Because more energy-efficient models tend to rely on new technologies which are usually more expensive than the technologies employed in the models that would be purchased by consumers in the base case scenario, a policy measure that bans inefficient models from the market will reduce energy costs to consumers, but it is also likely to impose higher investment costs on them. Hence, when evaluating energy efficiency policy measures, it is necessary to understand and be able to compare all of the expected results of each measure, including the potential tradeoffs among energy, economic, and environmental impacts. In Section 4, we will elaborate on a method for comparing potential tradeoffs. Figure 1 presents the framework's general procedure for assessing the impacts of any energy efficiency policy measure. The blue shaded boxes represent the tasks in which the required equipmentrelated parameters are developed. The Engineering Analysis provides the (unit) annual energy (and sometimes water) consumption and pollutant emissions for each considered energy efficiency design option. 7 The Cost Analysis provides, for each energy efficiency design option, the end-user price, installation costs, and lifetime maintenance, repair, and operating costs. (For policy measures that do not provide any financial incentive, results from the Cost Analysis for the base case and the policy measure case scenarios will be the same.)
Framework Structure
The red shaded boxes correspond to the forecast of annual shipments in the base case and policy measure case scenarios. Each of these forecasts produces a time-series of shipments per energy efficiency design option, within the same timeframe. The difference between the two time-series reflects the extent to which the measure is expected to transform the market by fostering the purchase of more efficient units of the targeted equipment.
The gray shaded boxes refer to the task in which, based on the equipment's engineering and economic parameters and on the shipments forecast, the total consumption of energy (and sometimes water), total 6 The net benefits for society builds upon the consumers' benefits, removing any financial incentive provided by the policy measure and including the monetized benefits from emissions reduction. They do not account, however, for any industry and government investments and operational costs necessary to support the policy. These costs have been proven negligible when compared to the benefits of some policy measures. For example, a study of the impacts of the U.S. appliance standards program estimated the cumulative (1988 -2030) net present value of standards (in place or scheduled to take effect) to be about a thousand times greater than the amount of taxpayer funds used to support DOE's residential appliance standards program over the prior 20 years (Meyers, McMahon and Atkinson, 2008) . 7 Energy efficiency design options refer to a set of representative technology options with similar consumer utility but different energy performance. This set may include both existing and potential technology options. consumers' investments and operating costs and total emissions is calculated. The way that consumption, investments, costs, and emissions are accounted for is exactly the same for both the base case and the policy measure case scenarios. The results, however, will vary according to the inputs provided.
Finally, the green shaded box refers to the evaluation of the results indicators that express the impacts of the policy measure being assessed. The impacts are calculated by assessing the differences in consumption, investments, costs, and emissions associated with the policy measure case and the base case scenarios. Figure 1 : General procedure to assess the impacts of energy efficiency policy measures Calculating these results indicators for a specific energy efficiency policy measure requires:
i. estimating the effects that the measure will have on consumer purchases, or how the shipments forecast will change for the policy case;
ii. accounting for energy and resource consumption, consumers' costs, and (direct and indirect) emissions resulting from the measure; and
iii. calculating the differences between the results from (ii) and the corresponding estimates for the base case scenario.
An energy efficiency policy measure will affect markets by changing the market penetration of the various energy efficiency design options while the policy measure is in effect. 8 8 An energy efficiency policy measure could ultimately lead to a sustainable market transformation. After fostering the purchase of more energy-efficient models for some time, the relative prices of these devices are likely to penetration can be expressed by a time series of annual shipments per energy efficiency design option that will be driven by the policy measure. For each policy measure, these annual shipments will differ from shipments in the base case scenario in their total quantity and distribution across design options.
Estimates of market
For each policy measure, the annual amounts of shipments per design option will determine the resulting estimates of total energy (and sometimes water) consumption, total consumers' investments and operating costs, and total emissions. These estimates, after being compared to their corresponding estimates for the base case scenario, ultimately establish the benefits of the measure. Hence, understanding how an energy efficiency policy measure affects shipments is paramount to assessing its effectiveness. A policy measure's impact on shipments is, therefore, the core of this framework. Once a policy analyst understands this relationship, the remaining evaluation of any policy measure is straightforward. 9
Calculating Results Indicators
As mentioned previously, calculating the results indicators (the green shaded box in Figure 1 ) for a specific policy measure depends first on the calculation of how the policy measure affects shipments. Section 3 details, for selected energy efficiency policy measures, how to estimate shipments (the policy case Shipment Forecast box in Figure 1 ). Once the effect on shipments has been determined, calculating the results indicators is fairly straightforward and is described here. 10 Let ( = 1, … , N) represent the -th energy efficiency design option of the equipment targeted by an energy efficiency policy (energy efficiency of increases with ); ( = 1, … , T) represent the sequence of years in a T-year assessment period 11
( )
End-user price of the units represented by shipped in (the -th year of the assessment period)
; and:
Total installation costs of the units represented by shipped in ( ) Lifetime maintenance costs of the units represented by shipped in decrease and make them more attractive to consumers. Also, the larger the penetration of those models into the market, the higher their acceptance by consumers. However, such (and any other) post-policy impacts are not (explicitly) taken into account in our approach. The policy analyst should, therefore, represent any post-policy effects that a policy measure may have on the market through dynamic prices, dynamic shipments, or any other appropriate variable. 9 The indicator cNPV also will be affected by any monetary incentive provided by the policy measure. This should be accounted for when calculating the total investment (Equation [4]). 10 The equipment economic parameters in the policy measure case scenario (the policy case Cost Analysis box in Figure 1 ) will be either: (a) given, for financial incentive measures; or (b) the same as the ones used for the base case otherwise. Further, the estimate of equipment engineering parameters (the Engineering Analysis box in Figure 1 ), as well as of equipment economic parameters and shipments for the base case scenario (respectively, the base case Cost Analysis and Shipment Forecast boxes in Figure 1 ), is out of the scope of this report and therefore not described here. 11 The length of the assessment period may vary with the purposes of the study, but will typically cover at least one full equipment lifetime period. The total lifetime energy and water consumption, emissions, and equipment 12 and energy costs of units of all energy efficiency design options shipped in the -th year of the assessment period can be calculated from:
and:
where: The cumulative (energy and water) consumption and emissions over the assessment period, 15 and the present values of the total investments and operating costs for the same period are given by:
Expressions [9] to [13] can be evaluated for the base case scenario and for the policy measure case scenario associated with each measure being assessed. 16 Based upon these results, the assessment indicators for each policy measure can be evaluated from: 17,18
15 These are site consumptions and emissions. To estimate the corresponding amounts of energy and water that need to be produced, as well as to account for emissions across the whole supply-chain of energy and water, Equations [9] and [11] should be evaluated as:
where: ( ) dynamic energy end-use-to-primary conversion factor ( ) dynamic water site-to-source conversion factor , ( ) dynamic emission factor of pollutant in the energy supply chain , ( ) dynamic emission factor of pollutant in the water supply chain. 16 Equations [9] to [13] depend on Equations [1] to [5] , where shipments are part of the evaluation. Some policy measures affect equipment price and, depending on the price-elasticity and the elasticity of substitution used (see Section 3), may consequently affect the total amount of shipments. When working with elasticities different than zero, for the sake of comparability of results, one should adjust the total shipments in the base case to reflect the effects that the elasticities might have on the total shipments in the policy measure case scenario. Alternatively, one can also evaluate Equations [1] to [5] on unitary basis, in which case the indicators calculated from Equations [9] to [13] will provide results at the consumer level rather than totals (see footnote 5 for the meaning of totals). 17 One could add, respectively, to and the energy savings resulting from water savings, and the water savings associated with energy savings. Also, when emissions from different pollutants can be converted to a common unit of measurement, the various , can be summarized into a single . 18 Results for , and , refer to site savings. See footnote 15 to estimate savings of primary energy and source water, as well as to account for emissions across the whole energy and water supply chains.
where:
Present value of monetary incentives provided by the policy measure 19
Present value of the monetized annual emissions reduction of provided by measure ( ) Market value of reducing one unit of emission of in .
Energy Efficiency Policy Measures
Several policy measures can foster purchase or production of energy-efficient equipment and contribute to an improvement in the overall energy efficiency of an economy. They range from mandatory standards to market-based policy approaches targeting both the supply-and demand-sides of the market. In this study we classify these measures as: energy efficiency standards; financial incentives; informational incentives; and government purchases. This section describes the measures and how they impact the market. It also outlines a methodology to estimate the effects of each type of policy measure on shipments of the equipment targeted by the policy.
Energy Efficiency Standards
Standards for the minimum energy efficiency of appliances in the United States first came into effect during the energy crisis of the mid-1970s, when high prices and increased environmental concerns drove many states to consider ways to cut the growing energy demand. Energy efficiency standards were implemented at the national level when a collaboration of manufacturers and energy efficiency advocates prompted the passage of the 1987 National Appliance Energy Conservation Act (Gillingham, 2006) . Today, mandated efficiency standards are employed worldwide as a mechanism to reduce energy consumption and the consequent emissions of greenhouse gases (IEA, 2000; Nadel, 2002; CLASP, 2011b) . 19 Monetary incentives are not accounted for in the indicator (Equation [18]) because consumers benefit from the incentives at the expense of taxpayers. For more details on financial incentive policy measures see Section 3.2. Mandated energy efficiency standards for a given product or group of products impact the total shipments of the targeted equipment and its distribution across energy efficiency design options. 20 The latter will be affected by the assumption that models with a rated energy efficiency that is less than the mandated minimum efficiency performance standard (meps) would no longer be marketed. Shipments of these devices would then be substituted by shipments of models with an energy efficiency level equal to the mandated meps. 21 This substitution, however, may be affected by the higher costs of the more efficient meps-compliant devices. Higher costs may reduce consumers' willingness to purchase or induce switching to other compatible types of equipment. These effects can be estimated from the price-elasticity of demand. Hence, for this policy case scenario, the shipments per energy efficiency design option can be estimated from:
and: Energy efficiency standards may also arise when government and industry engage in negotiations to establish new voluntary, non-mandated levels of meps (Nadel, 2002) . Manufacturers generally choose to participate in such a self-regulation approach to prevent the implementation of mandatory government regulations which they concern could be more onerous (OECD, 2002) . Shipments, in this case, can be estimated in a similar way as they are for mandated standards, yet assuming that not all shipments would meet the negotiated meps. 23 A modified version of Equation [19] should then be used:
where is the share of the base case shipments of design options with energy efficiency lower than the negotiated meps that would not meet the standard.
Financial Incentives
Government agencies have used financial incentives to attempt to increase the market penetration of energy-efficient equipment. Policy measures typically involve consumer rebates, 24 consumer and manufacturer tax credits, and early replacement programs. 25 (Nexus and RLW, 2005; SEEARP, 2009; DSIRE, 2011; US DOE, 2011a; TIAP, 2011a; TIAP, 2011b ) Monetary incentives to consumers may include reductions, refunds, or deferred payments of part or the entire purchase price of more efficient models. 26 Concerning manufacturers, monetary incentives usually include tax reductions for the production of more energy-efficient models. Such incentives reduce the total ownership cost of energyefficient equipment to consumers, making these devices more attractive when compared to the lower-cost, less efficient alternatives.
Consumer rebates typically offer direct price reductions with an immediate or fairly quick discount to the consumer. Consumer tax credits benefit the consumer when taxes are filed and hence have an implicit time delay, making them less attractive to consumers than a rebate. Manufacturer tax credits are assumed to be passed through to the consumer in the form of a reduced end-user price, but consumers may be unaware of the program and thus have lower participation.
For most policy approaches, this analysis methodology assumes that consumers are replacing inefficient equipment at the same time as they would be replacing it in the base case scenario (at the end of its service life). However, some consumers may replace their equipment earlier if a financial incentive is attractive enough. Therefore, a financial incentive designed to stimulate early replacements may shorten the time at which participating consumers make their purchases, effectively increasing the replacement rate for a certain period of time.
Reducing the cost to consumers of energy-efficient equipment is likely to increase its shipments. Three effects of a financial incentive will contribute to an increase in shipments of models meeting the target (efficiency) level 27 required by the policy measure:
(a) substitution of less efficient models from the same product class by any model covered by the measure;
(b) substitution of models from other (compatible) product classes by any model covered by the measure; and (c) early replacement of existing devices from the same or from any other (compatible) product class by any model meeting the target level. 28
The first effect can be estimated from the potential increase of the market penetration of models covered by the incentive as a response to the policy measure. The second effect will be proportional to the price-elasticity of substitution of devices from other product classes to which the one targeted by the policy can be an alternative. The third effect can be estimated either from historical data or any analytical approach representative of the decisions made by owners of devices of the targeted and other compatible equipment. Considering these three effects, shipments for this policy measure case scenario are estimated from:
27 Target level refers to a minimum efficiency level stipulated by a policy measure. 28 An early replacement policy measure restricts these effects to the third one. 29 When, in the base case, the shipments forecast in for all design options eligible to receive the incentive is zero (∑ ℎ , ( ) ≥ * = 0): (a) the increase in shipments due to the substitution of less efficient equipment by the ones eligible to the incentive (∆ ℎ , ( )) should be estimated using a different approach than the one proposed in this section (e.g. equipment utility-based market shares (ICF, 2007)); (b) the increase in shipments due to early replacements should be (conservatively) allocated only to the eligible design option with the lowest efficiency level ( * ). Consequently, equations [24] and [26] should be replaced by:
where ( ) is the market share of in estimated from the alternative method.
and: The shift of shipments from less to more efficient models of the targeted product class (∆ ℎ , ( )) may not be straightforward, even in the presence of a financial incentive, due to market barriers 31 30 We assume, for each design option , the availability of shipments data for a period of − 1 years before the first year of the assessment period. that are likely to prevent the full realization of the policy measure. Rufo and Coito estimated the potential electricity savings from energy efficiency measures in California (Rufo and Coito, 2002) . As part of their methodology, they developed a means of estimating customer acceptance of energy efficiency measures. In the study, they use a functional form to estimate market implementation rates according to the benefit/cost ratios of equipment with and without incentives and the estimated level of market barriers. The report presents five reference market implementation curves that vary according to the level of market barriers to technology penetration. These curves provide a framework to evaluate the penetration of energy-efficient equipment as a response to financial incentives, yet require matching the studied market to the curve that best represents it. 32 The approximate matching can introduce some inaccuracy to the analysis. More precise estimates can be reached from a market implementation function developed from interpolating between the five reference curves. Appendix A presents a functional form for such a function. 33 The market implementation function ( , ) presented in Appendix A provides an estimate of the market penetration of devices with a certain efficiency level according to their benefit/cost ratio to consumers ( ) and the level of market barriers to its dissemination ( ). 34 In the benefit/cost ratio, benefit refers to the energy cost savings that consumers will enjoy from using an energy-efficient device, and cost includes the likely greater purchase costs, and possibly installation and non-energy-related operational costs, associated with the energy-efficient equipment. A financial incentive will reduce the higher cost and thus increase the benefit/cost ratios of models covered by the policy measure. With a higher benefit/cost ratio, the market penetration of those devices will increase. The dynamic increase in market penetration ( ) can be estimated from: 35
where: 34 Alternative methods for predicting consumer response to financial incentives offered toward the purchase of energy-efficient equipment estimate adoption rates from: payback period and equipment utility-based market shares (ICF, 2007) , incentive level as a percent of total project cost (Mosenthal and Wickenden, 1999) , market data (Richey, 1998; Global, 2010) , and experts' judgment (Kintner-Meyer et al, 2003) . 35 See Appendix B for how to calculate ( ) when the level of market barriers of the studied market is below/above the lowest/highest barrier levels considered in Appendix A. The early replacement effect on shipments (∆ ℎ , ( )) can be estimated either from historical rates of anticipated replacements of the targeted and other compatible equipment in response to financial incentive programs, or from any analytical decision-making approach (e.g. repair versus replace) representative of the decisions made by owners of devices from these product classes. 37 Either approach should define a dynamic early replacement rate ( ) expressing the share of the stock of the equipment targeted by the program that is likely to be replaced in because of the policy measure.
Informational Incentives
Informational incentives aim at allowing individuals and businesses to make informed decisions. As an energy efficiency policy measure, informational incentives can promote energy-efficient equipment by disclosing and highlighting their life-cycle economic benefits to increase consumers' willingness to overlook the equipment's greater initial costs and, eventually, to purchase more energy-efficient devices.
By informing consumers on the existence and the benefits of higher efficient equipment, informational programs provide free publicity to these products and distinguish their manufacturers. Firms are increasingly recognizing the value of taking voluntary initiatives or joining a voluntary initiative led by industry associations or government, as a means to enhance their reputations and increase sales (OECD, 2002) . As a consequence, a greater share of the equipment being marketed will be composed of more energy-efficient equipment. Therefore, government agencies and utilities have used informational incentives to attempt to increase the market penetration of energy-efficient equipment (IEA, 2000; CLASP, 2011c) . 38 Policy measures involve endorsement and comparative labeling programs 39 (FTC, 2011; US EPA and US DOE, 2011) , best-in-the-market awards, media campaigns, and educational programs.
Increasing consumers' willingness to purchase more energy-efficient models is likely to increase shipments of these devices. The extent to which the more efficient models will penetrate into markets can be estimated based upon program goals or from historical data on the results of other similar programs. In the latter case, the expected increase in market penetration due to the policy measure under study can be estimated to be proportional to the penetration associated with the programs used as a reference.
Another way to understand the market transformation caused by earlier similar programs is estimating the extent to which they overcame the existing market barriers of the markets that they were targeting. This transformation can be evaluated from the same market implementation function used to estimate the market penetration of financial incentives. In this case, however, rather than working with different (ex-ante and ex-post policy) benefit/cost ratios over a single implementation curve, representative of the market under study, we analyze, across different market barrier curves, how the level of market barriers has evolved in that market concerning the models covered by the program. For each year ′ for which historical market penetration data is available, the relative change in market barriers level / ′ ( ′ ) can be estimated from the ratio between the levels of market barriers with and without the earlier program:
where ′ ( ′ ) and ′ ( ′ ) are such that:
38 Informational programs are also carried out by industry trade and other associations (AHAM, 2011; NEMA, 2011) and non-governmental organizations (CEE, 2011; FYP, 2011) . 39 Endorsement labeling programs promote the most energy-efficient models to consumers. Comparative labeling programs give consumers important information about equipment energy use. where: 
Government Purchases
Government can use its purchasing power to increase the demand for more energy-efficient equipment (McGrory et al, 2002; Harris et al, 2005; McGrory et al, 2006) . 41 The expected consequence is that stimulating manufacturers to increase the production of more energy-efficient equipment will reduce the prices of these devices relative to the less efficient ones, and eventually induce a shift in the larger non-government market.
Government can establish energy-efficient procurement policies that set lower bounds for the efficiency of equipment purchased by governmental agencies (US DOE, 2011b). Such a measure will require government agencies to adhere to these procurement specifications when they purchase energyconsuming products. Massive government purchases may avail government of a discounted quantity price. The shipments increase from government purchases can be estimated the same way as it is estimated for mandated energy efficiency standards, yet assuming the scope of the affected market would be restricted to government purchases. 8 Government agencies can also replace their existing stock of energy-consuming devices early, whenever the life-cycle cost benefits of such an initiative are attractive. In this case, shipments can be estimated from qualitative (e.g. vintage, efficiency) and quantitative characteristics of the governmentowned fleet of the targeted equipment.
Comparative Assessments
In Section 2 we introduced a set of indicators to compare the estimated results of a group of policy measures comprising an energy efficiency policy. As a first comparative assessment approach, the policy measure results can be contrasted across individual indicators. This will provide an initial view on how their potential savings compare to each other. This approach does not emphasize, however, the tradeoffs between energy-related amounts (energy consumption, energy costs or emissions) and non-energy-related costs of each policy measure that could affect the decisions of policy makers.
An alternative approach to comparatively assessing the effects of various policy measures is to plot their results in such a way that the joint equipment costs and energy-related results for each measure can be compared, in what we are calling a trade-off chart. 42 A trade-off chart is drawn by picking any variable associated with energy consumption (for example , or ) and the variable that expresses the total consumers' expenses with equipment as the axis of a twodimensional chart. The policy measure results are then plotted in the chart according to their (absolute or relative 43 41 See PEPS (2011) for an extensive list of international public sector energy-efficiency programs.
) values for each indicator selected for the axis. Figure 2 presents an example of a trade-off chart using relative values for a set of ten hypothetical policy measures. One of the benefits of a trade-off chart is that it helps with comparing the benefits from saving energy and the corresponding equipment costs. The chart also reveals the subset of measures, namely the ones closest to the origin (like measures p6, p1, p5, and p7 in Figure 2 ), that dominates the whole set of alternatives and defines the frontier of savings for the policy under assessment.
Assessing Energy Efficiency Policy Measures for Gas Furnaces in the U.S.
In this section, we demonstrate how to use the framework to compare the impacts estimated for twelve policy measures focusing on increasing the energy efficiency of gas furnaces in the United States. We rely on engineering and shipment data from the Technical Support Document (TSD) that was developed for the current energy efficiency standards rulemaking (US DOE, 2011d). Table 1 presents energy consumption and cost data for the available technologies across five energy efficiency design options, each one representing a certain value of the annual fuel utilization efficiency (AFUE). Table 2 reports the shipments forecasted for selected years in all scenarios. 44 The policy measures assessed refer to the following policy mechanisms targeting, alternatively, each of the design options:
(a) Energy efficiency standards set at the efficiency level of each design option except the current 44 We assume zero price-elasticity and zero elasticity of substitution. Therefore, the only effect that the policy measures have on shipments is on their distribution across design options. (c) Government purchase standards set at the level of each energy efficiency design option except the current baseline technology (Gov 0.90, Gov 0.92, Gov 0.95, Gov 0.98). Table 3 presents the total energy consumption and the present values (at a 3% discount rate) of consumers' expenses for equipment and energy. Table 4 summarizes the result indicators for each policycase scenario. Figure 3 presents a trade-off graph, covering all policy measures assessed and confronting base case-indexed energy costs with their corresponding equipment costs. 45 The baseline technology refers to the energy efficiency design option composed of commonly marketed equipment, usually with energy efficiency at the level mandated by the current efficiency standard. 
Conclusions
This report presents an integrated methodological framework to assess prospectively the energy, economic, and environmental impacts of energy efficiency policy measures. Comparing a range of policy measures requires that the analysis of all candidate measures use a common set of input data and express the benefits of the measures through the same results indicators. We show how to use the integrated framework to estimate the expected results of a policy measure, specifically the changes in market share of devices with different levels of energy efficiency and the resulting energy consumption, consumers' investments and operating costs, and pollutant emissions that are expected to occur within a given timeframe. We also show how to further compare the effects of various policy measures by plotting their expected results in such a way that, for example, the joint equipment costs and energy-related results for each measure can be compared, in what we are calling a trade-off chart. Finally, we demonstrate how to apply the framework methodology by using it to compare the impacts estimated for twelve candidate policy measures focusing on increasing the energy efficiency of gas furnaces in the United States.
The methodology should be a useful tool for policy analysts and policy makers when considering which policy measure can most cost effectively achieve a policy target. With its open framework, this methodology can be applied to any geographical scope-be it a state, sub-national region, nation, group of nations, or the whole world. It can also be applied to any sectoral scope, including a specific sector, group of sectors, or the whole economy. The framework can be extended to accomplish an analysis of any type of policy measure, as long as it is possible to specify how the measure will affect shipments of more efficient equipment, or essentially how it will transform a given market. Future work to further extend the utility of this framework would include addressing uncertainties and assessing the effects of combined policy measures.
Appendix A: Market Implementation Function
A.1 Market Implementation Function and Curves Rufo and Coito (2002) employ the following functional form to estimate the "percentage of the informed market 46 that will accept each [energy-efficiency] measure based on the participant's benefit/cost ratio":
imp implementation rate bc benefit/cost ratio max maximum annual acceptance rate for the technology mid inflection point of the curve fit parameter that determines the general shape (slope) of the curve.
In a more recent approach (US DOE, 2010; US DOE, 2011c; US DOE, 200d) Equation [A.1] has been slightly modified, with the constant value 1/4 replaced by a parameter r. By introducing this parameter in Equation [A.1] and rewriting it without the exponential and logarithmic operators, the market implementation rate can be evaluated using the following equation:
Rufo and Coito (ibid.) use Equation [A.1] to generate five primary (reference) market implementation curves. These curves produce "base year program results that are calibrated to actual measure implementation results associated with major [utility] efficiency programs." Different curves, generated using distinct values for parameters max, mid, fit, and r, reflect different levels of market barriers for different efficiency measures. The market barrier levels characterized by the five reference curves are: No Barriers, Low Barriers, Moderate Barriers, High Barriers, and Extremely High Barriers. Figure A. 1 presents the five reference curves. They build on the following functional form:
where b d is the market barrier level, and max d (b d ), mid d (b d ), fit d (b d ), and r d (b d ) are as shown in Table A .1 (and presented in Figure A .2).
To estimate the barrier level of a given market, based on the reference curves, one should seek for the curve that most closely represents the pair (benefit/cost ratio, market share) for the product and market under evaluation. The effect of a financial incentive on the penetration of more energy-efficient devices can then be estimated to be proportional to the effect that increasing the benefit/cost ratio of the equipment would have in a market represented by the selected reference curve. The four parameters (max, mid, fit, and r) were previously defined as discrete-value functions (max d (b d ), mid d (b d ), fit d (b d ), and r d (b d )) of the market barriers level (Table A .1, Figure A.1) . To facilitate the interpolation, it is necessary to transform the four discrete-value functions into continuous functions, the latter being thus capable of associating each of the four parameters to a real number denoting the market barrier level (b c ∈R). A numeric, continuous scale for the market barriers level is proposed, ranging from 0 to 5 (b c ∈[0,5]). The correspondence between the discrete-values of market barrier levels and b c are shown in Table A .2.
Based on the continuous-value market barriers levels, the parameters max, mid, fit, and r are interpolated using the following functions: Hence, estimating the market effects of such a program relies on finding the custom implementation curve that best represents the studied market. In other words, it involves finding b c such that the pair (bc, imp(b c ,bc)) equals the pair (benefit/cost ratio, market share) for the product and market under evaluation. Once the appropriate value of b c is found (e.g. = b c * ), the market penetration of more energy-efficient models under a financial incentive program can be estimated from the following equation:
where: b c * market barriers level corresponding to the studied market, and bc * benefit/cost ratio with financial incentive.
A.3 Final Remarks
The approach presented in this Appendix increases the accuracy of the estimate of the market implementation rate resulting from a financial incentive program. Consequently, it improves the analysis of the market effects of those programs. However, whereas it is feasible to develop interpolated r implementation curves between the former reference ones, there is no empirical support to extrapolate them beyond the No Barriers and the Extremely High Barriers curves. Nevertheless, a market penetration increase for markets with barrier levels beyond these boundary curves can be estimated to be proportional to the market increase that the financial incentive would promote in a market represented by these curves.
(See Appendix B for a discussion of this estimation method.)
